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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One’s Former Self ? 
1.  Introduction 
Is memory merely testimony from one’s former self ?  The short answer is, ‘No’.  1
The longer answer will require some setup.  We can start with an example. 
Detective Story:  After examining his clues, a detective concludes that it was 
Prof. Plum who committed the murder.  When he later speaks to the chief  
of  police, the detective reports this conclusion to the chief  without recalling 
the clues. 
Our Detective Story leaves out a number of  details.  It leaves out whether the 
detective’s clues really do support his conclusion that it was Prof. Plum who committed the 
murder.  It also leaves out whether the chief  holds the detective’s abilities in high or low 
regard, and whether he has good reasons supporting whatever attitude he holds.  So we 
cannot say, based solely on the information in the story, whether the detective is justified in 
the first place in concluding that it was Prof. Plum who committed the murder.  Nor can we 
say whether the chief  is justified in taking the detective’s word for it that it was Plum. 
Nevertheless, we can say something about the kinds of  factors on which the justification of  
their beliefs depends. 
Consider first the detective.  When he initially concludes that it was Prof. Plum who 
committed the murder, the reasons that persuade him are his clues.  So in the absence of  
other relevant evidence, whether the detective is justified in believing that it was Plum will 
depend on whether these clues amount to good reasons to believe it was Plum.  When he 
later reports to the chief  that it was Plum, it is appealing to say that unless he has changed 
his mind in the meantime, his reasons still are the clues themselves.  Consequently, it is 
appealing to say that whether he is justified still depends on whether the clues amount to 
good reasons to believe that it was Plum. 
Turn now to the chief  of  police.  His situation is different.  For the chief  does not 
know the clues that led the detective to believe it was Plum.  It is appealing to say that 
 Among the theorists who have discussed both the epistemology of  memory and testimony, answering ‘Yes’ 1
has been the dominant trend, exemplified in different ways by Burge (1993 and 1997), Christensen and 
Kornblith (1997), Lackey (2008), Owens (2000, Chs. 9-11), and Schmitt (2006).  Although not all authors who 
have written on the epistemologies of  memory and testimony have taken a stand on the question, I know of  
no one aside from Malmgren (2006 and forthcoming) who has argued that the epistemologies of  memory and 
testimony differ fundamentally.
For comments, advice, and discussion, I am grateful to Matthew Anisfeld, Yuval Avnur, Paul Boghossian, 
Justin Clarke-Doane, Jonathan Cottrell, Sinan Dogramaci, Hartry Field, Don Garrett, Peter J. Graham, Alex 
Guerrero, Pamela Hieronymi, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Beatrice Longuenesse, Colin Marshall, Tom Nagel, 
Jim Pryor, Stephen Schiffer, Declan Smithies, Sharon Street, Nick Treanor, David Velleman, Crispin Wright, 
three anonymous referees at this journal, and audiences at Duke University, the Northern Institute of  
Philosophy, Union College, the NYU dissertation seminar, and my Spring 2013 seminar on Intellectual 
Autonomy and Dependence at Union College.  I also wish to thank the University of  Edinburgh’s Eidyn 
Centre and the Union College Humanities Faculty Research Fund for their support.
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whether the chief  is justified in believing that it was Plum does not depend on whether the 
detective’s clues amount to good reasons.  Instead, if  the chief  is to be justified, then he will 
need his own good reasons to believe it was Plum.  Since the chief  knows only that the 
detective says it was Plum, it is appealing to think that whether the chief  is justified in 
believing that it was Plum will depend on the chief ’s evidence concerning the detective’s 
reliability. 
We have considered a pair of  prima facie attractive claims, one concerning the 
epistemic position of  the detective, and the other concerning the position of  the chief. 
Concerning the detective, we have said that his justification to believe it was Plum depends 
on whether the clues are good reasons to believe it was Plum.  Concerning the chief, we have 
said that his justification depends not on whether the detective’s clues are good reasons, but 
instead on the chief ’s own reasons for trusting the detective.  If  we accept this pair of  
claims, then we will say that the justification of  the detective’s belief  and the chief ’s depend 
on different kinds of  factors. 
Later on, I plan to argue for more general versions of  these prima facie attractive 
claims.  But before doing so, I want to explain how, taken together, they raise a puzzle. 
Consider a sequel to our detective story: 
Sequel:  Years later, the detective has forgotten the conclusion and the clues. 
He finds his long-lost diary, in which he had once recorded his conclusion. 
In the diary he finds it written that it was Prof. Plum. 
When we consider the Sequel and the original Detective Story side by side, we are 
faced with a puzzle.  For it is very appealing, and I think correct, to compare the detective’s 
new epistemic situation to the chief ’s.  That is, it is appealing to say that testimony from 
one’s former self  is epistemically akin to testimony from another person, and that the 
conditions in which one is justified in believing an item of  testimony are the same regardless 
of  whether its source is one’s former self  or someone else. 
At the same time, it also is very appealing, although I will claim ultimately misguided, 
to compare the detective’s new situation to the detective’s situation when he reported his 
conclusion to the chief.  That is, it is appealing to say that recalling a prior conclusion from 
memory is akin to receiving testimony from one’s former self, and that the conditions in 
which one is justified in believing what one seems to remember are analogous to those in 
which one is justified in believing what one instead reads in one’s diary.  The theorist who 
accepts this, and says that memory is like a diary, might say that it should not matter whether 
your memories are stored internally or are instead recorded externally in a diary, since these 
can appear to be two closely analogous means of  accomplishing the same end.  This 
theorist’s rough idea is that memory serves as a means for your present self  to gain evidence 
about what your former self  came to believe, just as testimony arguably serves as a means of  
gaining evidence about what someone else believes.  We will be in a better position to clarify 
this appealing, but in my view misguided, idea later on.  For now, we can characterize the 
view using a rough but suggestive slogan:  Memory is like a diary. 
The plan is as follows.  In Sections 2 and 3, I will consider epistemology of  
testimony from others and the epistemology of  ordinary memory, respectively, and I will try 
to reinforce the appealing claim that the justification of  memory- and testimony-based 
beliefs depend on different factors.  In Section 4, I will consider a misguided attempt to 
explain why the justification of  memory- and testimony-based beliefs depend on different 
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factors, which incorrectly treats testimony from one’s former self  as akin to memory rather 
than as akin to testimony from others.  In Section 5, I will introduce my preferred account, 
which appeals to a tight connection between the justification of  a belief  and its rational 
explanation.  As I will explain, the account appeals to an independently plausible but 
potentially controversial set of  claims about how the ‘internal’ faculty of  memory and an 
‘external’ source of  information like a diary each contribute to the overall rational 
explanation of  an agent’s beliefs.  Finally, in Sections 6 and 7, I will consider the epistemic 
implications of  revisionary metaphysical views that deny that memory and testimony differ 
in the way that I claim, either by extending the mind to include the apparently external 
source or by contracting the mind to exclude the apparently internal faculty of  memory. 
2.  Testimony from others 
Suppose that you are in midtown Manhattan searching for the Museum of  Modern 
Art (MoMA).  If  you ask a stranger where it is, and that stranger tells you that it’s on 53rd St, 
then that is an example of  testimony.  When the detective reports to the chief  that it was 
Prof. Plum who committed a murder, that too is an example of  testimony.  In ordinary cases 
of  testimony like these, it is common knowledge that the reliability of  a source’s testimony 
depends both on the reliability of  the source’s beliefs and on her sincerity in stating only 
what she believes.  Because my central aim is to contest the analogy between memory and 
testimony, I will focus on the ordinary cases, where the analogy with memory is on its 
strongest grounds.  2
Here I will explain and defend what I call the naive theory of  testimony.  I call it that 
even though I agree with it, because I find that it is the view many philosophers find 
appealing when they first start thinking about testimony.  The naive theory says that when a 
source of  testimony tells you that p, what you learn first is not p itself  but instead merely the 
fact that that the source says that p.  So if  you are to be justified in believing that p on the 
basis of  what you learn first, you must be in a situation where the fact that the source says 
that p is a good reason for you to believe that p is true.  The naive theory says something 
further about what it takes to be in such a situation.  It says that it does not depend on 
‘external’ factors, like whether the source is objectively reliable or whether the source actually 
knows that p.  Instead, it depends only on ‘internal’ factors, like whether you have any reason 
to doubt that the source is reliable, or whether you have evidence suggesting that the source 
knows whether p.  Since it is common knowledge in ordinary cases that the reliability of  a 
source’s testimony depends on both whether his testimony reflects what he sincerely believes 
and whether his beliefs reliably indicate the truth, I will take it for granted that in these 
ordinary cases the naive theorist must say that your justification to believe a source’s 
 In addition to ordinary cases, there are exotic cases which neither obviously qualify nor obviously fail to 2
qualify as cases of  testimony.  For example, consider Lackey’s case of  the creationist teacher (2008, 48-53), who 
in a professional capacity tells her students that humans descended from other hominids even though she does 
not believe it.  Even though the teacher is both insincere and unreliable in her privately held beliefs, Lackey 
claims that her students can still know what she tells them, and that this knowledge still qualifies as testimonial 
knowledge.  It is not necessary for our purposes to settle these matters.  We need only to make some 
generalizations about the ordinary cases of  testimony, without having to decide whether we have succeeded in 
offering a general theory that applies to all cases.
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testimony depends on your justification  to believe that the source is both sincere and 3
reliable.  In doing so, I will take the naive theory to say about these ordinary cases that for 
you a source’s testimony serves first as evidence about what that source believes, and that in 
turn can serve as evidence concerning what is true. 
The naive theory is intended to be compatible with a number of  familiar views in the 
literature.  In particular, it is consistent with, and is plausibly a consequence of, paradigmatic 
reductionist views of  testimony, which hold that testimonial knowledge and justification can be 
explained in terms of  one’s having a posteriori justification, deriving from non-testimonial 
sources like perception and induction, to believe that one’s sources, or perhaps even sources 
of  testimony in general, are sincere and reliable.  4
Even so, in explaining the naive theory I have been careful to remain neutral on an 
especially controversial commitment of  reductionism that has been the principal focus of  
many of  its critics:  that one can be justified in believing that one’s sources are reliable only 
on the basis of  a posteriori evidence (see, e.g., Burge 1993 and Coady 1992).  For it is 
consistent with the naive theory that one’s justification to believe that one’s sources are 
sincere and reliable need not derive from a posteriori evidence.  It is open to the naive theorist 
to claim, for example, that one has a default entitlement to believe that one’s sources are 
sincere and reliable, even in the absence of  positive evidence supporting their reliability.  5
Instead of  this controversial matter, I wish to focus on another that cuts across it—
that of  whether the justification of  your belief  depends solely on internal factors like your 
background justification concerning the source’s reliability, or instead also depends on 
external factors like whether your source is objectively reliable.  To get a better grip on this 
question we can consider an example: 
Two Sources:  Sherlock says that p and Clouseau says that q (where p and q 
are independent).  Sherlock is in fact reliable and justified, while Clouseau is 
unreliable and unjustified.  But your evidence does not favor the reliability or 
justification of  either source over the other.  You believe both Sherlock’s 
testimony that p and Clouseau’s testimony that q. 
Notice that Two Sources is schematic in that it does not specify whether you have 
justification to believe that your sources are reliable or justified in their beliefs.  Instead, it 
specifies only that whatever evidence you have does not favor one source over the other. 
This allows me to characterize two kinds of  views about Two Sources in a way that remains 
 Here and elsewhere, I use ‘justification’ broadly, to cover justification stemming from evidence or argument, 3
as well as any justification one might be thought to have by default (i.e., ‘entitlement’), or from non-inferential 
sources such as perception.  The naive theory is thus consistent with the view that one can justifiably believe a 
source’s testimony even without evidence that the source is reliable, so long as one has non-evidential justification 
to believe that the source is reliable.
 Hume (1993 [1777], Sec. 10) is often regarded as the classic exponent of  reductionism, and Harman (1965), 4
Lipton (1998 and 2007), Malmgren (2006), and Schiffer (2003) offer more recent, sometimes more qualified, 
forms of  reductionism.  See Adler 2014 for a helpful review.
  It should be noted that the naive theory as I have formulated it is not consistent with the closely related view 5
that one has default entitlement to trust particular items of  testimony, but not to believe that one’s source is 
reliable in general.  Even so, the differences between this view and the naive theory will be inessential for our 
discussion.  See fn. 25 below for a related point about memory.
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neutral on the question of  whether you can justifiably believe a source’s testimony without 
background justification to believe that the source is reliable. 
For a given way of  filling in the details of  the case, let’s say that a symmetrical verdict is 
one that says your belief  that p and your belief  that q are equally justified, either by saying 
either that both of  your beliefs are justified or that neither are.  An asymmetrical verdict is one 
that says instead that they are unequally justified—most plausibly, by saying that your belief  
based on Sherlock’s testimony is justified, while your belief  based on Clouseau’s is not.  We 
can now distinguish between two broad and potentially heterogeneous classes of  theories of  
testimony.  On the one hand, there are theories that always give symmetrical verdicts, no 
matter how the details of  the case are filled in.  Call these symmetrical theories of  testimony for 
short.  The naive view is an example of  a symmetrical theory, since it says that whether you 
are justified in believing a source’s testimony does not depend on the source’s actual 
reliability or justification, but instead on your background justification to believe that the 
source is reliable and sincere.  On the other hand, there are theories that sometimes give 
asymmetrical verdicts, depending on how the further details of  the case are filled in.  Call 
these asymmetrical theories of  testimony.  Asymmetrical theories say that at least sometimes the 
justification of  one’s own belief  depends on the actual reliability or justification of  one’s 
source, while symmetrical theories say that the justification of  one’s beliefs never depends on 
those kinds of  factors. 
One familiar example of  an asymmetrical theory is reliabilism, which says roughly 
that in the absence of  defeaters your justification to believe what a source says depends on 
its objective reliability.  Concerning Two Sources, the reliabilist says that if  you believe both 
that p and that q, your belief  that p, which has as its source the reliable Sherlock, will be 
justified, while your belief  that q, which has as its source the unreliable Clouseau, will be 
unjustified.  6
Reliabilism yields asymmetrical verdicts about cases involving a wide range of  
sources, from other people to measuring devices like a fuel gauge or a thermometer.  But the 
asymmetrical rival to my preferred naive theory that will be our primary focus here, 
transmissivism, is more specific to the epistemology of  testimony from other people.  The 
transmissivist joins the reliabilist in saying that the justification of  your beliefs depends on 
the objective credibility of  your source.  But according to the transmissivist, what matters is 
not whether the source is reliable but instead whether the source’s own belief  is justified. 
The transmissivist’s basic idea is that in the absence of  your own reasons for believing that p, 
you can, through the testimony of  a source who tells you that p, hold a belief  that p that is 
justified (if  at all) by the source’s reasons rather than your own.  In the jargon, the point is 
sometimes put by saying that the justification of  a source’s belief  is transmitted along with 
the belief  itself  to the recipient of  the source’s testimony. 
Transmissivism as I have formulated it is a striking view.  To be sure, it is very 
plausible that a source’s reasons can affect whether one acquires knowledge from that source’s 
 Whether familiar kinds of  reliabilism entail this type of  reliabilism about testimony will depend on how 6
belief-forming methods are individuated.  On a very coarse-grained individuation of  methods, both of  your 
beliefs in Two Sources are formed by the same coarsely individuated method (i.e., trusting testimony).  A reliabilist 
who individuates methods this coarsely is not committed to the kind of  reliabilism about testimony that I will 
discuss here.  However, I suspect that no matter how the reliabilist individuates methods, there will be cases 
with the same general structure as Two Sources about which she will be committed to asymmetrical verdicts.
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testimony.  If  you are told that p by a source who believes p for no good reason, then, 
barring exceptional circumstances, your belief  that p will not amount to knowledge.  But the 
transmissivist goes further, and says that a source’s reasons matter for whether one’s belief  is 
even justified.  It is admittedly difficult on a first pass to make sense of  the idea that the 
justification of  one’s own belief  can depend on the reasons possessed by another person. 
Nevertheless, transmissivism is deserving of  our attention, for at least two reasons.  First, 
transmissivism has a number of  prominent supporters.  It has been advocated recently by 
David Owens (2000, Ch. 11) and Frederick Schmitt (2006), and it is natural to take Tyler 
Burge’s classic work (1993 and 1997) to be committed to it.   Second, and more importantly 7
for our purposes, we will see in Section 3 that transmissivism is a natural counterpart to an 
attractive and, in my view, correct theory concerning the epistemology of  memory.  We 
should therefore evaluate transmissivism on its own terms now, so that we can see later on 
why its problems fail to extend to a corresponding view about memory.  8
At least for theorists attracted to an externalist conception of  justification, 
transmissivism has some prima facie appeal.  For it is clear that in some sense your belief  
based on Sherlock’s testimony has more going for it, epistemically speaking, than your belief  
based on Clouseau’s testimony does.  Although the beliefs are on a par so far as your own 
reasons are concerned, your belief  that p has a kind of  external corroboration from 
Sherlock’s reasons that your belief  that q does not receive from Clouseau’s.  This might be 
taken by the externalist to mean that your belief  derived from Sherlock’s testimony can have 
enough going for it to qualify as justified, even when your belief  derived from Clouseau’s 
does not.  But some transmissivists have gone further, and claimed that even philosophers 
who are averse to strongly externalist theories like reliabilism can nonetheless accept 
 Note that Owens goes on to qualify his view by claiming that there is a distinct “dimension of  rationality” on 7
which transmissivism is false, but the claims I advance here stand opposed even to this qualified version of  
Owens’ view.  Although Plantinga (1993, Ch. 4) argues for transmissivism about warrant, as he understands the 
term this commits him only to the claim that one’s source’s justification matters for whether one’s belief  can 
amount to knowledge.  See Lackey (2008) for criticisms of  this kind of  view.  Like Plantinga, Burge (1993 and 
1997) focuses on the claim that a source’s reasons matter for whether one’s own belief  can amount to 
knowledge, and the closest Burge comes to an endorsement of  transmissivism about justification is equivocal 
(1997, fn. 2; see also Edwards, 2000 for discussion).  But I think Burge is most naturally read as endorsing 
transmissivism about justification as well.  When pressed by Christensen and Kornblith (1997), Burge is direct 
in endorsing a corresponding preservative view of  memory (1997, pp. 37-39) that I discuss in greater detail in 
Section 3 below.  An analogy between memory and testimony is a central theme in Burge’s work, and Burge 
leans heavily on this analogy in motivating his central thesis that one can acquire a priori knowledge by 
testimony.  It is therefore natural to take him to be committed to transmissivism about justification.  It should 
be noted, however, that another central theme in Burge’s work, the Acceptance Principle (1993, pg. 467), is on 
its own consistent with a symmetrical theory of  testimony.
 See also Malmgren 2006 for objections to Burge’s view that are largely independent from those I develop 8
below.  Although the particulars of  Malmgren’s objections to Burge hinge on difficult exegetical matters, I take 
her to have raised an important general problem for any transmissivist who maintains that testimony can confer 
a priori knowledge.  Burge’s claim that one can acquire a priori knowledge of, say, a mathematical theorem from 
the testimony of  a teacher is surely radical.  But as Malmgren notes, it would seem indefensible for Burge 
moreover to claim that one can have a priori knowledge of  the proposition that the teacher says the theorem is 
true, since this proposition concerns deeply contingent matters of  fact.  If  one’s knowledge of  this proposition 
is admitted to be a posteriori, however, then this would seem to raise trouble for Burge’s claim that one’s 
knowledge of  the theorem itself  is a priori.  For it would seem that the proposition that the teacher says the 
theorem is true is one’s basis for belief  in the theorem itself, and that, if  so, one’s belief  in the theorem cannot 
be a priori.  See fn. 33 below, for a potential response available to Burge.
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transmissivism’s contention that your corroborated belief  that p can be justified even when 
your uncorroborated belief  that q is not.  For the sense in which a corroborated belief  has 
more going for it is not merely a matter of  the objective reliability of  its source.  Instead, 
there is an important sense in which there are stronger reasons backing up a corroborated 
belief, even if  those reasons are not always available to the agent herself.  9
However, I think that this motivation for transmissivism, which identifies a belief ’s 
being justified with its having something going for it epistemically, misses something 
important about the distinctive nature of  justification ascriptions.  In calling a belief  
‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’, we do not merely attribute to the belief  positive or negative 
epistemic characteristics, as externalists sometimes suggest (e.g., Plantinga 1988 and 
Goldman 1986, 20-26).  We moreover issue a kind of  recommendation in favor of  or against 
holding the belief.  To say that a belief  is justified in a given situation is to recommend 
holding the belief  as the epistemically appropriate thing for an agent in that situation to do
—i.e., as the thing that such an agent ought to do, epistemically speaking.  Correspondingly, to 
say that a belief  is unjustified in a given situation is to recommend against holding that belief, 
and in favor of  withholding belief  instead. 
There are many ways that the rough idea that justification ascriptions go along with 
recommendations to hold or withhold belief  might be developed.  There is room among 
philosophers sympathetic to this idea for disagreement about whether the kind of  epistemic 
recommendations at issue ever take wide scope over conditionals,  about whether they are 10
best understood as imperatives or as normative propositions,  and about what it means for 11
an agent to follow them.   And as I will explain below, there is further room for 12
disagreement on the question of  whether the recommendations that go along with 
justification ascriptions should be thought of  as permissions or as prohibitions, and whether 
we ever can be epistemically permitted to adopt a doxastic attitude without being prohibited 
from adopting others.   For the most part, however, we can bypass these difficult issues 13
here.  As we will see, the commitments of  my central argument against transmissivism are 
quite modest ones, and are likely to be accepted by anyone broadly sympathetic to 
understanding justification in terms of  what one epistemically ought to believe, what one is 
 Owens (2000, 133-134) emphasizes this point in attempting to distance his transmissivist view from 9
reliabilism.
 See, e.g., Broome 1999 and 2005 and Kolodny 2005.  It should be noted that disagreements between wide-10
scopers and narrow-scopers are sharpest when it comes to cases, unlike those at issue here, in which an agent 
already holds one or more irrational attitudes.  Even concerning these controversial cases, narrow-scoper 
Kolodny still rejects the view that ascriptions of  rationality and irrationality are “purely evaluative,” and 
unconnected to recommendations.  On Kolodny’s view, to say that a belief  is rational for an agent is to 
recommend holding the belief, but in a way that is relativized to the agent’s point of  view.
 See, for example, Boghossian’s (2008, Section 1) discussion of  whether epistemic rules should be understood 11
as normative statements or as imperatives.
 See Goldman (1999) for a critical and I think uncharitable discussion of  the idea that facts about justification 12
should guide us in our beliefs—although as Goldman notes, some proponents of  the idea have unfortunately 
understood it in just the way Goldman criticizes.  For discussions with which I am more sympathetic, see 
Boghossian 2008 and Pollock and Cruz 1999, Ch. 5.
 See, e.g., Schoenfield 2014, White 2005, and Boghossian, 2008, Section 1.13
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permitted to believe, what one is rationally required to believe, and so on—and even by 
some who are hostile to these ways of  understanding justification. 
The rough idea behind the argument against transmissivism is this:  If  we follow the 
transmissivist in saying that your beliefs in Two Sources are asymmetrically justified, then it is 
difficult to avoid the unattractive consequence that asymmetrical doxastic attitudes could be 
justified.  More specifically, if  we say that you are justified in believing Sherlock’s testimony 
that p but unjustified in believing Clouseau’s testimony that q, then it is difficult to avoid the 
consequence that you could be justified in jointly believing that p and withholding belief  
from q.  And this consequence is implausible because believing that p while withholding 
belief  from q involves flagrant irrationality, since by stipulation you have no reason to take 
Sherlock’s testimony to be more credible than Clouseau’s.  14
The argument is most easily developed if  we help ourselves to some potentially 
controversial assumptions regarding the nature of  the epistemic recommendations at issue—
namely, that they involve claims about what one ought to believe, and that these claims 
sometimes take wide scope over conditionals.  For given the former assumption, we should 
take asymmetrical theories like transmissivism to be committed to the claim that one ought 
to believe Sherlock’s testimony that p and that one ought not to believe Clouseau’s testimony 
that q—that is, that Ought-Bp & Ought-(~Bq).  The argument against this claim appeals to 
two premises, the first of  which is that if  you ought not to believe that q, then you ought 
instead to withhold belief  from q—that is, 
(1) Ought-(~Bq) ⊃ Ought-Wq. 
This premise is plausible, because for any proposition that one considers, one must either 
believe it or withhold belief  from it.  So in recommending against one’s holding a belief, one 
recommends withholding belief  instead. 
The second premise appeals to the intuition that it would be flagrantly irrational for 
one who is aware of  no reason to trust Sherlock over Clouseau nevertheless to believe 
Sherlock’s testimony that p while withholding belief  from Clouseau’s testimony that q.  Since 
it is plausible that one ought not to be flagrantly irrational, it plausibly follows that one ought 
not to believe that p while withholding from q—that is, 
(2) Ought-[~(Bp & Wq)]. 
It is a familiar principle of  deontic logic that one cannot have logically incompatible 
obligations, and thus that if  Ought-(~A), then ~Ought-A.  And it is furthermore familiar 
that the obligation operator aggregates over conjunction, such that if  Ought-B & Ought-C, 
then Ought-(B & C).  It therefore follows from (2) that 
(3) ~(Ought-Bp & Ought-Wq). 
From (1) and (3), it follows that 
 (4) ~[Ought-Bp & Ought-(~Bq)], 
 See Huemer 2006 for an attempt to develop an objection to reliabilism that draws on what I take to be the 14
same core insight.  I am skeptical, however, that Huemer’s argument supports his positive theory of  
justification, as I hope to discuss elsewhere.
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contrary to what asymmetrical theories like transmissivism hold. 
In arguing against transmissivism in this way, we have helped ourselves to a number 
of  potentially controversial assumptions.  Firstly, we have assumed that the kinds of  
recommendations issued by justification ascriptions are obligations, rather than mere 
permissions.  This assumption will be denied by permissivists about justification, who 
otherwise are sympathetic to the idea that justification ascriptions go along with 
recommendations of  a sort.  Secondly, we have assumed that one ought to be rational, and 
thus that one ought not to believe that p while withholding belief  from q.  This assumption 
might be denied by some externalists, who might simply deny any connection between 
rationality and what one ought to believe.  But it might furthermore be denied by narrow-
scopers like Niko Kolodny (2005), who accept a more limited connection between rationality 
and what one ought to believe, even while denying that one ought to be rational  I think the 
assumptions hostile to permissivists and narrow-scopers are inessential to the argument. 
After explaining why, I will return to the potentially more serious challenge from externalists. 
In motivating premise (1), we have assumed that one is obligated to believe what one 
is justified in believing, as permissivists would deny.  But even if  we instead hold that one is 
merely permitted to believe what one is justified in believing, it remains plausible that if  you 
are not justified in believing Clouseau’s testimony, then you must be justified in withholding 
belief  from it.  This follows from the more general thesis that 
Existence:  Given one’s total evidence, there exists at least one justified 
doxastic attitude that one is in a position to take to any proposition.  15
Like the stronger Uniqueness thesis that it is modeled on (White, 2005), the 
Existence thesis makes reference to a plurality of  doxastic attitudes that one is in a position 
to take to a proposition.  Traditionally, philosophers have acknowledged three such attitudes: 
belief, disbelief, and suspended judgment.  But more recently, many theorists have wanted to 
expand the range of  doxastic attitudes, either by including a continuum of  degrees of  
confidence,  or by distinguishing between a state of  deliberately refraining from adopting a 16
belief  and that of  merely failing to arrive at a view.   We do not need to decide whether to 17
countenance doxastic attitudes beyond the traditional three.  Instead, we can simply employ 
the notion of  withholding belief  in a liberal way, such that an agent counts as withholding 
belief  from a proposition if  she has any doxastic attitude to that proposition other than 
belief.  For our purposes, the important upshot of  the Existence thesis is simply that if  you 
cannot justifiably believe a proposition, then you can justifiably withhold belief. 
 I discuss the Existence thesis in more detail in Barnett 2014.  Richard Feldman (2005, 282-283) appeals to a 15
similar principle in his discussion of  forgotten evidence cases of  memory, though I think the principle’s 
application to these cases is less straightforward than Feldman makes it out to be.
 Since the support that one’s reasons provide for a proposition can come in degrees, those who also allow for 16
confidence to come in degrees should presumably say that one ought, epistemically speaking, to proportion 
one’s degree of  confidence in a proposition to the degree to which one’s reasons support it.  While I think we 
should accept this graded picture of  justified credence, I will not assume it in what follows.  Thanks to an 
anonymous reader for pressing me on this issue.
 See, e.g., Bergmann 2005.  Note that Bergmann uses the term ‘withholding belief ’ to refer to the state of  17
deliberately refraining from adopting a belief, whereas I will use it more broadly to encompass any case in 
which an agent does not adopt a belief  that the proposition is true.
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It should be stressed that the Uniqueness thesis, the thesis on which the Existence 
thesis is modeled, remains controversial.  But unlike the stronger Uniqueness thesis, which 
says that there is always exactly one justified doxastic attitude that one can take to any 
proposition, the Existence thesis is consistent with a permissivist view of  justification on 
which multiple doxastic attitudes sometimes can be justifiable given a single set of  evidence. 
The Existence thesis thus stands opposed only to the possibility of  epistemic quagmires—
situations in which no doxastic attitude could be justified.   This makes Existence difficult 18
to reject if  we accept that justification ascriptions go along with epistemic recommendations. 
If  you consider whether a proposition is true, then you must take some doxastic attitude to 
the proposition.  So if  we recommend against your believing the proposition, it seems 
inconsistent for us also to recommend against your withholding belief  from it. 
Even so, Existence stands in need of  an important qualification.  In denying the 
possibility epistemic of  quagmires, the Existence theorist does not deny the possibility of  
your being psychologically incapable of  adopting a justified attitude.  If  a reason-impairing 
drug has left you incapable of  seeing the obvious consequences of  your evidence, the 
Existence theorist can grant that there is a sense in which you cannot adopt a justified belief  
in those implications.  Even so, there remains an important sense in which, despite your 
inability to make use of  the evidence available to you, you still are in a position justifiably to 
believe the implications of  your evidence.  It is this sense that the Existence theorist has in 
mind when he says that there always is a justified attitude that you are in a position to take 
toward any proposition.  This important qualification of  Existence offers little relief  to the 
transmissivist, however, who in denying that your belief  in Clouseau’s testimony is justified 
wants to deny that you are even in a position to justifiably believe his testimony.  19
The argument against asymmetrical theories like transmissivism also assumes that 
justified doxastic attitudes are obligatory in moving from (2) to (3).  Recall that this move 
appeals to the plausible principle that obligations aggregate over conjunction, such that if  
one is obligated to believe p and obligated to withhold from q, then one is obligated to 
jointly believe p and withhold from q.  A corresponding principle is far less plausible for 
mere permissions, but for reasons that I think are unlikely to be of  help to the transmissivist. 
The permissivist might contest the aggregation principle by claiming that even if  your 
evidence permits a range of  doxastic attitudes towards each of  a pair of  propositions, the 
attitude that you in fact take to one of  those propositions can further constrain the attitudes 
you justifiably can take to the other.  For example, the permissivist might think that given 
ambiguous meteorological evidence, you can justifiably believe both the proposition that it 
will rain and the proposition that it will be cloudy, and you also can justifiably withhold 
belief  from both of  these propositions, even though you cannot justifiably jointly believe 
that it will rain and withhold belief  that it will be cloudy.  The reason why I doubt that this 
move will help the transmissivist is that the transmissivist does not think that you could 
justifiably adopt a range of  attitudes toward Clouseau’s testimony that q in the first place. 
Since the transmissivist must say that you can be justified only in withholding belief  from 
Clouseau’s testimony that q, it does not appear open to the transmissivist to say that by 
 For recent supporters of  epistemic quagmires, see Avnur 2012, Christensen 2010, and Jackson 2011.  The 18
issue is naturally seen as a counterpart to an older and better known debate in ethics over the possibility of  
moral quagmires (or dilemmas).  See McConnell 2010 for a recent review.
 Cf.  Owens (2000, p.  141), who treats cases of  unsubstantiated testimony as akin to deficits of  reasoning and 19
memory.
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doing so you make unavailable to yourself  an otherwise justifiable attitude of  belief  to 
Sherlock’s testimony that p. 
The argument against transmissivism might also be resisted by narrow-scopers like 
Kolodny, who deny that we have a standing obligation to be rational.  Recall that in 
motivating (3), we appealed to (2), which says that one ought not to believe that p and 
withhold from q on account of  the irrationality of  adopting these attitudes jointly.  The 
claim that one ought not to believe p and withhold from q—i.e., that Ought-[~(Bp & Wq)]
—is equivalent to a controversial wide-scope rational requirement that Ought-(Bp ⊃ ~Wq). 
Narrow-scopers resist such claims, because they deny that one has standing obligations to 
avoid irrational sets of  attitudes.  But their rejection of  standing obligations to avoid 
irrational attitudes is compatible with a weaker assumption that is sufficient to motivate (3). 
The weaker assumption is simply that we are never obligated to adopt irrational attitudes. 
This weaker assumption is sufficient to motivate (3), which holds only that you are not both 
obligated to believe Sherlock’s testimony that p and to withhold from Clouseau’s testimony 
that q.  And this weaker assumption should not be objectionable to narrow-scopers, who are 
happy to accept, in place of  putative wide-scope requirements, corresponding claims in 
which the obligation operator takes narrow scope.  There is thus nothing in the narrow-
scoper’s view that would prevent him from accepting the claim that Ought-Bp ⊃ Ought-
(~Wq), from which (3) follows under the plausible assumption that if  Ought-(~Wq), then 
~Ought-Wq.  20
So far we have considered objections to the argument against transmissivism from 
friendly sources, who agree in general terms that justification ascriptions go along with 
recommendations as to what to believe, and that these recommendations are at least 
constrained by what one can rationally believe in the limited way necessary to motivate (3). 
But what about a more radically externalist response, which simply rejects that what one is 
justified in believing is constrained by what one can rationally believe? 
It should be noted that a wholesale rejection of  a connection between rationality and 
justification is a more radically externalist posture than transmissivists have typically taken 
their view to commit them to.  Indeed, there are limits to how far even committed 
externalists like reliabilists have been willing to allow the justification of  an agent’s belief  to 
come apart from the reasons available to the agent herself.  As is now familiar, even staunch 
externalists have included a ‘no defeaters’ provision in their accounts of  justified belief, and 
transmissivists have followed suit.   The purpose of  these provisions is to avoid allowing an 21
agent to be justified in believing the testimony of  an objectively reliable source when the 
agent herself  has strong reasons to believe that the source is not reliable.  Asymmetrical 
theorists of  all stripes have thus allowed the objective epistemic credentials of  a source’s 
testimony to make a difference to the justification of  an agent’s belief  only at the margins, 
when the agent lacks strong reasons of  her own.  Even so, I think that when we turn from 
cases involving a single belief  from a single source to cases like Two Sources, it is clear that a 
‘no defeaters’ provision fails to avoid licensing doxastic attitudes that are irrational by the 
agent’s own lights.  For even if  the asymmetrical theorist avoids licensing attitudes that are 
irrational taken on their own, she still is committed to licensing combinations of  attitudes 
 I thank an anonymous reader for pressing me on this issue.20
 While all transmissivists allow for defeating evidence to undermine a belief ’s extended corroboration, the 21
point is especially prominent in Burge (1993 and 1997).
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that strike us as equally irrational because they discriminate between sources that from the 
agent’s perspective appear equally credible.  By joining with fellow asymmetrical theories like 
reliabilism in licensing such combinations of  attitudes as justified, the transmissivist thus 
falls into traditional problems for externalist theories, despite the protest of  some 
transmissivists that their view retains internalism’s core connection between justification and 
reasons (e.g., Owens, 2001, 133-134). 
But there are further problems for a transmissivist who seeks to defend his view by 
severing justification from rationality, beyond its commitment to a stronger kind of  
externalism than transmissivists have traditionally accepted.  The central problem with this 
or any similar response on behalf  of  transmissivism is that it robs the view of  its core source 
of  motivation, which comes from an alleged analogy between memory and testimony.   As 22
we will see in Section 3 below, when we turn our attention from testimony to memory, we 
find that a natural counterpart to transmissivism, which I call preservativism, has considerable 
appeal.  Transmissivists have appealed to a natural, but in my view mistaken, analogy 
between memory and testimony to support their view that testimony can transmit a source’s 
justification for a belief  to its recipient, claiming that if  we accept preservativism about 
memory, this should lead us to accept transmissivism as well.  But as we will see, accepting 
preservativism requires no corresponding rejection of  the view that one cannot justifiably 
adopt irrational beliefs. 
3.  Memory 
It is natural when discussing the epistemology of  memory to focus on tricky cases 
where the initial storage and subsequent retrieval of  information from memory plays a 
conspicuous role:  cases involving fuzzy memories of  episodes from the distant past, or in 
which one has forgotten the reasons that led one to believe a conclusion that one still 
remembers, or in which the reliability of  one’s memory is in question.  Here I will focus 
instead on easy cases in which you retain both a belief  and the evidence that it is based on 
over a relatively short period of  time, and in which no reason to doubt the reliability of  your 
memory arises.  So when I speak of  a case of  memory I mean any case where a person 
comes to believe something at one time and continues to believe it until a later time, without 
having forgotten or changed her mind in the time in between.  And when I speak of  the 
faculty of  memory I am speaking broadly of  the psychological mechanisms, whatever they 
may be, that typically enable this maintenance or preservation of  belief  over time.  When 
you learn that the MoMA is on 53rd St. on Monday and then later on Wednesday take a left 
on 53rd St. to go to the MoMA, that is a case of  memory.  And when the detective in 
Detective Story concludes that it was Plum who committed the murder and then later on 
 The alleged analogy between memory and testimony plays a major dialectical role in the argument’s of  Burge 22
(1993), Owens (2000), and Schmidt (2006).  But it should be noted that some transmissivists, most prominently 
Owens, claim as further motivation their view’s apparent anti-skeptical implications, alleging that one cannot 
give a philosophically satisfying reply to skepticism about testimony without accepting their view that our 
testimony-based beliefs can be justified by the reasons possessed only by our sources.  But I think that 
restricting transmissivism to a kind of  justification (or ‘justification’) disconnected from rationality substantially 
weakens the anti-skeptical motivation for transmissivism as well.  For such a restricted form of  transmissivism 
will be of  no assistance in combatting skeptical worries that it is irrational for us to believe the things we do on 
the basis of  testimony.  This is especially troubling if  we accept that rational belief  is a necessary condition for 
knowledge.  For if  so, it would seem that transmissivism could at best help with skeptical worries that our 
ordinary testimony-based beliefs are Gettier cases, in which one rationally believes the truth, and yet still fails to 
know.
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reports this conclusion to the chief, that too is a case of  memory.  Cases of  memory thus are 
not limited to cases involving episodic memories, but instead include all cases where belief  
or knowledge is preserved over time. 
Regarding testimony from another person, we have considered a transmissivist view 
that says that the epistemic status of  the belief  can be transmitted through testimony along 
with the belief  itself.  The preservativist makes a corresponding claim about cases of  memory: 
that the epistemic status of  a belief  can be preserved along with the belief  itself  in 
memory.   In the ordinary cases of  memory at issue here, preservativism can seem very 23
attractive, even obvious.  When the detective comes to believe that it was Prof. Plum based 
on some clues, whether his belief  is justified depends on whether the clues really are good 
reasons to believe that it was Plum.  When he later reports to the chief  that is was Plum 
without recalling the clues themselves from memory, we think that the justification of  his 
belief  continues to depend on whether the clues themselves are good reasons to believe that 
it was Plum.  Any complete theory of  the epistemology of  memory will have to go beyond 
the apparently easy cases like this.  But here I will contrast preservativism with an extreme 
view that says that preservativism gets things wrong in even what appear to be the easy cases. 
The view that I have in mind is a natural counterpart to the naive theory of  
testimony.  Since a diary is a means of  conveying testimony from one’s past self  to one’s 
present self, I call the theory that treats memory on the model of  what we naively want to 
say about testimony the diary model of  memory.  The naive theory of  testimony says that even 
when you receive testimony whose content is that p, what you learn first is not p itself  but 
rather that the source in question says that p.  And the diary model of  memory 
correspondingly says that when you seem to remember that p, what happens first is that you 
become aware of  the psychological fact that you currently seem to remember that p. 
Whether this puts you in a position to be justified in now believing that p will depend on 
whatever background justification you have concerning the reliability of  what you seem to 
remember,  just as for testimony your justification to believe your source’s testimony 24
depends on your background justification concerning the reliability of  your source.  In 
ordinary cases of  testimony, the reliability of  a source’s testimony that p depends both on 
the reliability of  what she says as an indicator of  what the source believes and the reliability 
of  what the source believes as an indicator of  what is true.  Similarly, it is common 
knowledge that in ordinary cases of  memory the reliability of  your apparent memories 
depends both on the reliability of  memory itself  as a record of  your prior judgments and on 
the reliability of  your prior judgments as an indicator of  the truth.  Since this is common 
knowledge, the diary theorist says that in ordinary cases, whether you are justified in 
believing what you seem to remember depends on your having background justification (or 
entitlement) to believe both that your apparent memories are a reliable indicator of  your 
prior judgments and that your prior judgments your prior judgments are a reliable indicator 
 Preservativism has been widely discussed, but I am especially indebted to discussions from Tyler Burge (1993 23
and 1997) and David Owens (2000, Ch. 10).
 An anonymous reader asks whether the diary theorist should take the justification of  a particular memory 24
belief  to depend on one’s background justification concerning the reliability of  one’s memory in general, or 
instead concerning its reliability in some more specific context.  The diary theorist owes us an answer to this 
question, but I think he is in no worse shape than anyone else.  For we all should agree that, e.g., one’s 
justification to believe the reading of  a fuel gauge can depend on one’s background justification concerning the 
reliability of  the fuel gauge.  And similar questions arise for that case as well.
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of  the truth.  In saying all this, the diary model treats memory as a means of  gaining 
evidence about one’s former judgments in much the way that we naively take ordinary 
testimony to serve as a way of  gaining evidence about the beliefs or judgments of  another 
person.  The diary model thus treats recalling information from memory as akin to acquiring 
testimony from one’s former self—like reading the entries in one’s long-lost diary.  25
It is worth emphasizing that in accepting an analogy between memory and a diary, 
the diary theorist does not merely deny, as many theorists do, that the justification of  one’s 
present belief  can depend upon evidence that one has forgotten.   The diary theorist goes 26
further and denies that the justification of  one’s belief  can depend on evidence that is still 
stored in memory but is merely not occurrently accessed.  In saying this, the diary theorist is 
making an extreme and controversial claim.  But this claim is arguably what we should say if  
we take seriously the analogy between ordinary memory and a diary.  When the detective in 
Sequel reads in his diary that it was Plum who committed the murder, we think that the 
justification of  his belief  does not depend on whatever clues appear on unread pages of  his 
diary.  This is because we think that the justification of  an agent’s beliefs depends on the 
reasons the agent has, and not on whatever reasons the agent would easily be able to 
acquire.   Similarly, the diary theorist says that the justification of  a conclusion you recall 27
from memory depends only on whatever reasons you actually recall, and not on whatever 
further reasons you could recall but do not.  28
These commitments make the diary model a striking view.  But it is nevertheless 
deserving of  our attention for several reasons.  Firstly, it has behind it a tradition of  
prominent supporters, going back at least to Descartes, and continuing on through more 
recent theorists like Roderick Chisholm, Richard Feldman, and John Pollock.   Secondly, the 29
diary model is the natural counterpart to the naive theory of  testimony, and if  we are to 
reject the prima facie appealing option of  extending what we have said about testimony to 
ordinary cases of  memory, then we should understand why.  And finally, even though it is 
false, I think the diary model contains important insights that will figure into a positive 
account of  some hard cases of  memory that involve memory failures, forgotten evidence, 
and evidence against the reliability of  your apparent memories.  To know what we should say 
 One closely related view says that it is your apparent memory itself, rather than your awareness of  its 25
occurrence, that justifies you currently in believing that p.  This view might also be coupled with the further 
claim that one’s apparent memories justify beliefs even in the absence of  justification to believe that one’s 
apparent memories are reliable, so long as one lacks justification to believe that they are unreliable.  Such a view 
would have much in common with Pryor’s (2000) dogmatism about perceptual justification, but with apparent 
memories in place of  perceptual experiences.  Although the differences between this and the standard version 
of  the diary model are important, my criticisms of  the diary model will apply equally to both views—and to 
any view that holds that one’s justification to believe what one seems to remember depends solely on the state 
of  one’s background justification concerning the reliability of  one’s apparent memories.
 Theorists who deny this claim include Dogramaci (MS), Feldman (2005), and Harman (1973).  Feldman 26
elsewhere (2004) endorses the diary model.
 Cf.  Gibbons’ (2006) ‘access externalism’.27
 Feldman, 2004 is especially clear on this point.28
 See, e.g., Chisholm 1989, 29-30; Feldman 2004; and Pollock and Cruz 1999, 45-55.  The discussion of  29
memory in Pollock and Cruz 1999 is unchanged from an earlier edition of  which Pollock is the sole author.  I 
discuss the historical matter of  Descartes’s views elsewhere (Barnett, MS).
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about these hard cases, we first must understand what the diary model mistakenly says about 
even the easy cases. 
One of  the diary model’s central commitments about even easy cases of  memory is a 
natural counterpart to the naive theory’s symmetrical implications concerning Two Sources. 
Consider: 
Two Beliefs:  On Monday you came to believe that p for good reasons that 
justified your belief, and on Tuesday you came to believe that q for bad 
reasons that failed to justify it (where p and q are independent).  It is now 
Wednesday, and you have forgotten nothing, reconsidered nothing, and 
learned no new relevant evidence.  You recall each conclusion without 
occurrently recalling your original reasons for those conclusions. 
As with Two Sources, Two Beliefs is schematic in that it leaves unspecified your 
background justification to believe in your general reliability at reaching true beliefs and 
maintaining them in memory over time.  Again we can distinguish between two broad classes 
of  theories.  The symmetrical theories of  memory are those that say that no matter how these 
details are filled in, on Wednesday your belief  that p and your belief  that q are equally 
justified.  And the asymmetrical theories of  memory are those say that, depending on how the 
details of  the case are filled in, it could be that on Wednesday your belief  that p is justified 
even though your belief  that q is unjustified. 
We have seen that the naive theory is a symmetrical theory of  testimony because it 
says that your justification to believe a source’s testimony depends on your own justification 
to believe that the source’s testimony is reliable, rather than on whether the source actually 
has good reasons to believe what he says.  Correspondingly, the diary model is a symmetrical 
theory of  memory because it says that your justification to believe what you seem to 
remember depends on your current justification to believe that your apparent memories are 
reliable rather than on whether your initial reasons for accepting a recalled conclusion were 
good ones.  In contrast, transmissivism is an asymmetrical theory of  testimony because it 
says that the justification of  Sherlock’s justified belief  that p and of  Clouseau’s unjustified 
belief  that q can be transmitted along with the beliefs themselves through testimony.  And 
correspondingly, preservativism is an asymmetrical theory of  memory because it says that 
the justificatory status of  your justified belief  that p and your unjustified belief  that q are 
preserved along with the beliefs themselves in memory. 
We saw in Section 2 above that there are strong reasons to reject asymmetrical 
theories of  testimony like transmissivism and reliabilism.  For as we saw, it is difficult to say 
that your beliefs in Two Sources are asymmetrically justified without also saying that 
asymmetrical doxastic attitudes could be justified.  This is a problem for asymmetrical 
theories of  testimony because it is implausible that you could be justified in jointly believing 
Sherlock’s testimony that p and withholding belief  from Clouseau’s testimony that q.  Since 
you are aware of  no reason to trust Sherlock’s testimony over Clouseau’s, it seems patently 
irrational for you to do so—and it is unattractive to allow doxastic attitudes to qualify as 
justified despite this sort of  patent irrationality.  In contrast, asymmetrical theories of  
memory fare better.  For unlike in a case of  testimony like Two Sources, it is not implausible 
in Two Beliefs that asymmetrical doxastic attitudes could be justified.  This is because on 
Wednesday you still have available the bad reasons that led you to believe that q to begin 
with.  Since you therefore are in a position to justifiably give up your belief  that q, in saying 
that your Wednesday belief  that q is unjustified the preservativist need not deny the 
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Existence theorist’s contention that if  you are unjustified in believing a proposition then you 
must be in a position justifiably to withhold belief  from that proposition.  This is in stark 
contrast to the transmissivist, who says of  Two Sources that your belief  in Clouseau’s 
testimony that q is unjustified even though you are in no position justifiably to withhold 
belief  from q if  you believe Sherlock’s testimony that p. 
Not only does the connection between a belief ’s justification and the agent’s own 
reasons for the belief  fail to raise problems for preservativism (as it did for transmissivism), 
this connection also provides strong motivations in preservativism’s favor.  For if  you believe 
that p on Wednesday for the same good reasons as you did on Monday, then your belief  that 
p should still be justified on Wednesday.   And if  you believe that q on Wednesday for the 30
same bad reasons as you did on Tuesday, then your belief  that q should still be unjustified on 
Wednesday.  In denying that your beliefs are asymmetrically justified on Wednesday, 
symmetrical theories like the diary model must therefore contend that your reasons for 
holding those beliefs have changed even though you have learned nothing, forgotten 
nothing, and learned no new relevant evidence in the meantime. 
We will consider how the diary theorist might try to support this contention in 
Section 7.  For now I want to emphasize only that however unattractive these commitments 
might make it appear, the diary model can at the same time seem obligatory if  we turn our 
attention back to the epistemology of  testimony.  For we have seen the strong motivations 
behind symmetrical theories of  testimony like the naive theory.  And when we consider the 
initial appearances, it can seem that there is little difference epistemically between memory 
and testimony.  So far I have tried to argue, against a strong temptation to the contrary, that 
there memory is not epistemically akin to testimony, since we should accept preservativism 
about the former and the naive theory of  the latter.  In the following sections I will consider 
some attempts to explain why memory and testimony differ in this way.  In Section 4, I will 
consider and reject a candidate explanation that I suspect many philosophers otherwise 
would be attracted to.  Then in Section 5, I will give my own preferred explanation. 
4.  Testimony from one’s former self 
In our discussion of  Detective Story in Section 1, we considered a view which holds 
that the justification of  one’s memorial and of  one’s testimonial beliefs depend on different 
kinds of  factors.  Concerning testimony, this view says that when one comes to hold a belief  
via testimony, as the police chief  in Detective Story does when he believes the detective’s 
claim that it was Prof. Plum who committed the murder, the justification of  one’s belief  
does not depend even in part on whether one’s source has good reasons for the belief, but 
instead only on one’s own reasons for thinking that the source’s testimony is reliable.  This 
claim is the central thrust of  the symmetrical naive theory of  testimony.  And concerning 
memory, the view says that when you retain a belief  in memory, as the detective does when 
he initially concludes that it was Plum and then later reports his conclusion to the chief, the 
justification of  your belief  continues to depend on whether the reasons that persuaded you 
in the first place are good, so long as you learn nothing, forget nothing, and change your 
mind about nothing in the meantime.  This is the central thrust of  preservativism about 
memory.  Thus anyone who accepts both the naive theory of  testimony and preservativism 
 Here I assume that if  a given set of  reasons are good reasons to believe that p on Monday, then they will 30
remain good reasons to believe that p on Wednesday.
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about memory most hold that memory and testimony differ epistemically in the way I have 
in mind. 
The naive theory and preservativism on their own can appear superior to their 
principal competitors, transmissivism and the diary model.  But it can appear puzzling how 
we might accept both the naive theory and preservativism together.  For when we consider 
cases where one receives testimony from one’s former self, such as when the detective in 
Sequel reads in his long-lost diary that it was Plum who committed the murder, it is natural 
to see similarities both to cases of  testimony from another person and to cases of  beliefs 
that are preserved in ordinary memory.  So if  we accept that memory and testimony from 
another person differ, then we are left with a dilemma.  On the one hand, we could accept 
the analogy between testimony from one’s former self  and testimony from another person, 
in which case we must draw a line between memory and testimony from one’s former self. 
On the other hand, we could accept the analogy between memory and testimony from one’s 
former self, and instead draw a line between testimony from one’s former self  and testimony 
from another person. 
In defending preservativism against the diary model of  memory, I have already 
suggested some reason to favor the former option of  drawing a line between memory and 
testimony from one’s former self.  But before expanding on what I already have said, I want 
to consider the alternative possibility of  drawing a line instead between testimony from one’s 
former self  and testimony from another person.  For sake of  concreteness, I will consider 
what I take to be the most natural example of  an account that does so, although my criticism 
of  it will not depend on any details that might distinguish it from other possible accounts 
that draw a line in the same place.  The account, which I extrapolate from rough suggestions 
that I have often received in conversation, is what I call the responsibility account, because it 
says that the crucial difference between memory and testimony from others lies in who bears 
responsibility for the belief ’s having something going for it epistemically. 
The responsibility theorist identifies justified belief  with belief  for which the agent is 
blameless, and goes on to explain the epistemic differences between memory and testimony 
in terms of  a difference in who’s to blame if  a belief  lacks epistemic credentials.  If  you believe 
Clouseau’s unjustified testimony that q, then depending on the circumstances you could be 
blameless for your belief ’s lack of  external corroboration.  So the responsibility account says, 
correctly, that you are no less justified in believing Clouseau’s testimony that q than you are 
in believing the justified Sherlock’s testimony that p.  If  on the other hand you come to hold 
a belief  for bad reasons and then retain that belief  in memory, you have only yourself  to 
blame for your belief ’s lack of  corroboration.  So the responsibility account says, again 
correctly, that you can be unjustified in your uncorroborated belief  that q even while you are 
justified in your corroborated belief  that p. 
Thus the responsibility account correctly yields both symmetrical verdicts about 
cases of  testimony from other people and asymmetrical verdicts about cases of  memory. 
Where it goes wrong, in my view, is in where it draws a line when distinguishing between 
them.  We have seen that any account of  the epistemic differences between memory and 
testimony must draw a line either between testimony from others and testimony from one’s 
former self, or between testimony from one’s former self  and memory.  The responsibility 
account takes the former course, since it says that justification goes with responsibility.  If  
you unjustifiably believe a conclusion that you record in your diary, then upon later reading it 
you will have only yourself  to blame should the conclusion have little going for it 
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epistemically.  In this way the responsibility account allows us to accept the analogy between 
memory and a diary that animated the diary model even without accepting the diary model 
itself.  But in doing so the responsibility theorist runs into the same kinds of  difficulties that 
the transmissivist faced.  For consider: 
Two Entries:  Years ago, you believed that p for good reasons and you 
believed that q for bad reasons.  You recorded both that p and that q in your 
diary along with your reasons.  As time went by you forgot all about your 
beliefs and the reasons that led you to hold them.  Today you find your diary, 
and you read the entry that says p and the entry that says q without reading 
the reasons that led you to believe these propositions in the first place.  On 
the basis of  what you have read, you believe both that p and that q. 
Like Two Beliefs and Two Sources before it, Two Entries is schematic in that it 
leaves unspecified whether you are justified in believing that your diary entries are reliable. 
As with those cases, we can distinguish between two potentially heterogeneous classes of  
theories:  symmetrical theories, which say that you are equally justified in believing that p and 
that q no matter how these details are filled in, and asymmetrical theories, which say that 
depending one the details you can be justified in believing that p even while you are 
unjustified in believing that q.  The responsibility account is asymmetrical about this case of  
testimony from one’s former self  because, unlike the Two Sources case involving testimony 
from other people, you have only yourself  to blame for the fact that your belief  that q has 
little going for it epistemically.  Since the responsibility account identifies justified belief  with 
blameless belief, it says that your blameworthiness for believing that q can make this belief  
unjustified even when your blameless belief  that p is justified. 
The responsibility account’s asymmetrical verdict about Two Entries is unattractive 
for reasons that are by now familiar.  If  we follow the responsibility theorist in accepting that 
you are justified in believing that p but unjustified in believing that q, then we will be forced 
to grant that you must be justified in jointly believing that p and withholding belief  from q. 
But when you read the two diary entries, one that says p and another that says q, you cannot 
justifiably believe one of  the entries but not the other unless you have some reason to favor 
one over the other.  So the responsibility account, which is committed to an asymmetrical 
verdict about Two Entries, must be rejected. 
5.  Rational explanation and the boundaries of  the mind 
We have just seen reason to reject any account of  the epistemic differences between 
memory and testimony that, like the responsibility account, draws a line between testimony 
from another person and testimony from one’s former self.  We now will consider what I 
view as the superior option of  drawing a line between testimony from one’s former self  and 
memory.  I call the account that I favor the rational explanation account, because it appeals to a 
tight connection between the justification of  a belief  and its rational explanation. 
A rational explanation of  a belief  is a special kind of  answer to the question ‘Why do 
you believe that?’—an answer that cites the reasons or considerations that convince you that 
what you believe is true.  When a detective comes to believe on the basis of  some clues that 
it was Prof. Plum who committed a murder, for example, a rational explanation cites the 
detective’s clues in explaining why he believes that it was Prof. Plum.  We can follow 
convention in calling the relation between an agent’s beliefs and the reasons that the belief  is 
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based on the basing relation.   Although it is plausible that the basing relation is a species of  31
causal relation, and that rational explanations are correspondingly a species of  causal 
explanations, it is a familiar point that not all causal explanations of  one belief  in terms of  
other beliefs amount to rational explanations.   When the chief  of  police believes the 32
detective’s testimony that it was Plum, the causal etiology of  the chief ’s belief  can be traced 
back to the detective’s belief  that it was Plum, and from there to the detective’s beliefs about 
the clues.  Nevertheless, this kind of  interpersonal causal connection is not the right kind to 
underwrite a rational explanation of  the chief ’s belief, since the chief ’s basis for believing 
that it was Plum cannot include clues known only to the detective.  Although the detective’s 
beliefs are part of  the causal etiology of  the chief ’s belief, the chief ’s reasons for the belief  
are the considerations that convince the chief  that it was Plum—i.e., the fact that the 
detective says so, perhaps in addition to other evidence that the chief  has regarding the 
detective’s reliability. 
The rational explanation account handles the epistemic differences between memory 
and testimony by appealing to the different ways in which ordinary memory and a diary each 
contribute to the rational explanation of  an agent’s beliefs.  When the detective in Sequel 
reads in his long-lost diary that it was Prof. Plum who committed the murder, he comes to 
hold a belief  that by stipulation he did not hold shortly beforehand.  Intuitively, we want to 
say that when he does so he believes that it was Plum on the basis of  his diary’s saying so, 
just as the chief  of  police would if  he were to read the same entry in the detective’s diary.  In 
contrast, memory typically serves to maintain one’s beliefs along with the reasons on which 
they are based on over time.  When you recall from memory the name of  a close friend, you 
do not come to hold a new belief  about what your friend’s name is.  Instead, you merely 
bring to your attention a fact which you have believed for some time, even when you are not 
attending to it.  During the times when you are not attending to it, your belief  about your 
friend’s name is not held on the basis of  facts about what you seem to remember regarding 
your friend’s name, for at those times you do not seem to remember anything regarding your 
friend’s name.  So when you go on to recall your friend’s name from memory, it is 
implausible that the basis for your belief  about the friend’s name is a fact about what you 
currently seem to remember.  For it is implausible that the bases for your standing beliefs 
change dramatically from one moment to the next, depending on what you are attending to. 
Similarly, it is implausible that the detective’s reasons for believing that it was Plum change 
dramatically depending on where he turns his attention.  When he first comes to believe that 
it was Plum, he does so on the basis of  his clues, and these clues continue to be his reasons 
while his attention turns elsewhere.  So when he later reports to the chief  that it was Plum 
by recalling it from memory, we should grant that his basis for the belief  is still the clues 
 Sometimes in talking of  an agent’s reasons for a belief, theorists refer not to facts or propositions but instead 31
to the agent’s beliefs regarding those facts or propositions.  Here it can be difficult to distinguish mere 
terminological differences from more substantive disagreement, but at any rate I doubt that even substantive 
disagreements about the metaphysics of  reasons will matter for our purposes.  John Turri (2009) has a recent 
discussion with a helpful review.
 Although it is widely acknowledged in discussions of  the basing relation that mere causation is insufficient 32
for basing, typical examples of  causation without basing involve intrapersonal Rube Goldberg-like processes 
whereby one’s believing that q causes one to believe that p without one’s believing that p on the basis of  q.  But 
our interest here is not these Rube Goldberg-like causal connections but instead mundane causal connections 
that typically obtain interpersonally in cases of  testimony.  See Turri 2011 and Wedgwood 2006 for recent 
discussions of  the basing relation.
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themselves and not facts about what he seems to remember.  This stands in stark contrast to 
the situation years later in Sequel, when the detective reads in his diary that it was Plum.  For 
it is plausible that his reasons change when he forgets that it was Plum and then comes to 
believe it again upon reading his diary. 
The rational explanation account takes this difference in the metaphysics of  memory 
and a diary to underwrite downstream epistemic differences.  Radical views like 
transmissivism to one side, we ordinarily take it for granted that the reasons that justify your 
belief, if  it is justified, must be the very same reasons that explain why you hold that belief. 
Even if  there are perfectly good reasons to believe that p ‘out there,’ we think that your 
belief  that p will be unjustified if  your reasons for holding the belief  are not good ones. 
The transmissivist denies this identification of  the reasons that explain your belief  and the 
reasons that justify it, for the transmissivist thinks that the latter can include reasons known 
only to your source.   And this means that the transmissivist must allow you to be justified 33
in adopting doxastic attitudes like beliefs even if  you do not do so for good reasons.  In 
contrast to radical views like transmissivism, the rational explanation account of  the 
epistemic differences between memory and testimony takes there to be a tight connection 
between justification and rational explanation, along roughly the following lines: 
Connection:  Any belief  that is justified by reasons is justified by the reasons 
for which the agent herself  holds the belief. 
This claim is intended only as a first approximation of  the kind of  commitment that 
the rational explanation account brings with it.  But even so, it should be clarified in a 
number of  ways.  First, Connection is restricted to beliefs that are justified by reasons in 
order to leave open the possibility of  beliefs that are justified in a way that does not derive 
from reasons that the agent herself  or anyone else possesses for the belief.  (Some might 
claim this of  perceptually justified beliefs, for example, or of  beliefs that are allegedly 
justified by default.)  It is plausible that if  we accept Connection, then we also should accept 
corresponding claims about at least some cases of  beliefs that are justified otherwise than by 
reasons.  For example, it is plausible that if  we accept Connection, we should accept that if  a 
belief  is immediately justified by perceptual states, then it must be immediately justified by 
the agent’s own perceptual states.  I will not explore the matter further here, however.  The 
second point of  clarification concerns what makes a given set of  reasons good reasons for 
believing that p.  For our purposes here, all we must assume is that whether a source’s saying 
that p is a good reason to believe that p does not depend on whether the source has good 
reasons to believe that p.  Without this assumption, an asymmetrical theory of  testimony 
could get in through the back door, as it were.  We saw general arguments against such 
asymmetrical theories in Sections 2 and 4.  I think it is possible to generalize this style of  
 Cf. Malmgren (2006, 226-230), who in effect takes the transmissivist Burge to be committed to denying that 33
one’s basis for believing an item of  testimony are propositions about what the source has said.  I think Burge 
might instead deny what I below call Connection, which holds that the reasons justifying a belief  must be the 
same as those which form the agent’s (psychological) basis for the belief.  This could allow him to grant that 
one’s basis for believing an item of  testimony include propositions about what the source has said that one 
knows only a posteriori, even while the justification of  one’s belief  in the testimony comes solely from the 
source’s (potentially a priori) reasons.
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argument further into an argument that whether a reason is good can depend only on 
internal factors, but it is not necessary to do so here.  34
By invoking Connection, the rational explanation account can offer us a satisfying 
explanation of  why the justifications of  memory and of  testimony beliefs depend on 
different factors.  In an ordinary case of  testimony like Detective Story, the reasons for 
which the police chief  believes that it was Prof. Plum who committed the murder are limited 
to things known (or at least believed) by the chief, such as the fact that the detective says that 
it was Plum, and perhaps that the detective is likely to be sincere and reliable.   In contrast, 35
we want to allow that the detective’s reasons for believing that it was Plum can include the 
detective’s clues, even when the detective is not occurrently recalling them.  I take this to be 
because the detective still knows, and hence still believes, the clues even when he is not 
occurrently recalling them, and thus that the clues themselves can still be among his reasons 
for believing that it was Plum. 
Because what one’s reasons are can depend in this way on what one believes, the 
rational explanation theorist draws a line epistemically between memory and testimony in a 
place that corresponds to the boundary between what is internal and what is external to the 
mind of  the believer.  For in our naive ascriptions of  beliefs, we take these mental states to 
depend on what an agent has stored ‘internally’ in memory.  Even if  two agents are alike in 
other ways, we think that they can differ with respect to their beliefs in virtue of  differences 
in the information stored in memory, even when that information is not being occurrently 
accessed.  In contrast, we do not take an agent’s mental states to depend on what she has 
recorded in an ‘external’ source of  information like a diary.  We naively take it that two 
otherwise similar agents who differ with respect to what they have written in their diaries 
might differ with respect to what they are disposed to believe if  they go on they read what 
they have written, but they do not on that account differ with respect to what they currently 
do believe.  This is why we think that when a diary-user does go on to believe what she reads 
in her diary, she forms a new belief  that is explained by the new reasons she has available 
when she forms it.  The rational explanation account thus explains the epistemic difference 
between memory and a diary by appealing to an upstream difference in the metaphysics of  
mind. 
As we have just seen, in our naive belief  ascriptions we distinguish implicitly between 
internal cognitive faculties like ordinary memory and external sources like a diary.  Although 
I am sympathetic to these naive ascriptions, in the remaining sections I will consider the 
epistemic implications of  revisionary metaphysical views that reject the naive ascriptions 
either by extending the mind to include an apparently external diary, or by contracting the 
mind to exclude the apparently internal faculty of  memory.  In Section 7, we will consider 
the latter kind of  revisionary view, which seeks to take our naive attributions of  beliefs and 
their bases in cases of  diary-reading and extend them to cases of  memory.  There I will 
argue that if  we take Connection seriously, then we should take the diary model of  the 
 See Wedgwood 2002 for an attempt to argue in a different way from considerations involving rational 34
explanation to a kind of  internalism about justification.
 See also Malmgren (2006, 225-226), who notes that one would be disposed to cite facts about what one’s 35
sources have said if  asked why one holds a belief  from testimony.  Malmgren admits that this observation 
about what we are disposed to cite as our reasons do not definitively establish what our reasons are.  But they 
are at least suggestive that one’s (psychological) basis for beliefs derived from testimony includes propositions 
about what one’s sources have said.
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epistemology of  memory to be committed to this revisionary metaphysics of  mind.  But 
before turning to these matters I wish to first consider a recent trend that is revisionist in the 
opposite direction, by seeking to extend to at least special cases of  diary-reading the belief  
attributions that we naively favor in ordinary cases of  memory. 
6.  The extended mind 
In cases like Two Entries and Sequel, an agent reads a small number of  entries in a 
long-lost diary.  Regarding these cases it should be uncontroversial that the diary functions 
merely as a means of  conveying testimony from an agent’s past self  to that agent’s present 
self.  But Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) have famously argued that in special cases 
an agent’s use of  a diary can become so habitual and systematic that it takes on a functional 
role in the agent’s overall cognition that is very similar to the role usually filled by ordinary 
biological memory.  And in these cases, Clark and Chalmers claim, our ascriptions of  
person-level mental states to the agent should be no different from our naive ascriptions in 
cases where ordinary biological memory plays a similar role.  Consider an adapted version of  
Clark and Chalmers’ principal example: 
Otto’s Diary:  Otto suffers from chronic memory loss, and he compensates 
by making heavy use of  a diary.  On Monday Otto learned from a trusted 
source that the MoMA is on 53rd St, and he recorded in his diary both the 
location of  the MoMA and the identity of  his source.  By Tuesday Otto has 
forgotten both the location of  the MoMA and the identity of  his source, 
although he could look up the information in his diary at any time.  On 
Wednesday he will be in midtown Manhattan looking for the MoMA, and he 
will look up that it is on 53rd St. without bothering to look up the identity of  
his source. 
There is a ‘sub-personal’ level of  explanation on which it is clear enough what is 
going on both in Otto’s head and on the pages of  his diary.  What is controversial is what it 
means for Otto’s ‘person-level’ mental states, including Otto’s beliefs.  Clark and Chalmers 
have famously advocated the revisionist position that despite what we naively would say, we 
should say that on Tuesday Otto believes that the MoMA is on 53rd St. , even though this 
information is stored only in his diary and not in ordinary biological memory.  The central 
thrust of  their argument appeals to a kind of  functionalism about mental states like belief, 
along with an auxiliary premise that “the information in the notebook functions just like the 
information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief.”  Although I am sympathetic to 
Clark and Chalmers’ functionalism, I am skeptical of  their conclusion because I am skeptical 
of  the auxiliary premise.  But here I want to bracket the question of  whether the extended 
mind thesis is true to focus instead on the epistemic implications it would bring with it. 
If  we accept the extended mind theorist’s revisionist claims about Otto’s beliefs, then 
it is appealing to extend the revisionism to Otto’s reasons for his beliefs as well.  For if  we 
follow the extended mind theorist in saying that on Tuesday Otto believes that the MoMA is 
on 53rd St, then presumably we should also say that his reason can be the fact that his 
trusted source says so, rather than the fact that it says so in his own diary.  For surely on 
Tuesday Otto does not believe that it was on 53rd St. for the reason that it says so in his 
diary, since on Tuesday he has not yet looked in his diary to see what it says.  Nor is it 
plausible that on Tuesday Otto believes that the MoMA is on 53rd St. but does so for no 
reason at all.  So it appears that the diary theorist must extend his theory in an independently 
plausible way by saying that Otto’s diary serves to maintain not only the state of  belief  but 
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also the reasons the belief  is based on.  And unless the extended mind theorist wants to 
claim that Otto changes his reasons for holding the belief  when he looks in his diary on 
Wednesday, he should grant that this is Otto’s reason for the belief  on Wednesday as well. 
The upshot is simply that if  we buy in to extended beliefs, then we also should buy in to a 
correspondingly extended conception of  the basing relation. 
We have observed that even though there is agreement about what is happening at 
the sub-personal level, there is room for debate about what this means for Otto’s person-
level attitudes like beliefs, and for their person-level explanations in terms of  reasons.  The 
proponent of  the rational explanation account has no distinctive commitments in this 
debate.  Where the rational explanation theorist does have a distinctive commitment is the 
question of  the epistemic implications of  the debate over extended mental states.  For the 
rational explanation theorist must say that if  we follow the extended mind theorist in 
adopting an extended metaphysics of  mind, then we should adopt an extended epistemology 
as well.  This is because the rational explanation account says that what distinguishes 
memory from a diary epistemically is the role that each serves in the determination of  what 
your reasons are for your beliefs.  If  there are special cases where a diary plays a role in the 
determination of  your reasons for belief  comparable to that ordinarily played by memory, 
then the epistemology of  such cases should follow the metaphysics of  mind.  The rational 
explanation theorist thus should accept the conditional that if  Otto’s mind is extended, then 
Otto’s situation epistemically resembles ordinary cases of  memory rather than cases of  
testimony from one’s former self.  In doing so, the rational explanation theorist takes the 
epistemology of  controversial cases like Otto’s Diary to go along with the metaphysics of  
mind. 
7.  The contracted mind 
We have just discussed recent theorists who advance a revisionary metaphysics that 
extends the mind beyond the boundaries we implicitly take it to have in our naive attitude 
ascriptions.  I now wish to consider an older and historically more influential tendency to 
contract the mind from what we ordinarily take its boundaries to be.  A paradigmatic 
example of  this tendency is found in Descartes.  Concerning the philosophy of  mind, 
Descartes is most famous for his dualism, under which the mind is an immaterial substance 
that interacts with the material brain.  A less famous but no less distinctive feature of  
Descartes’s philosophy of  mind is the surprisingly restricted role that the mind plays in what 
might broadly be called our ‘cognition’.  For instance, in the case of  memory Descartes held 
that all but a special, purely intellectual class of  one’s memories are stored outside the mind 
in the folds of  one’s brain. 
Descartes surely held this external storage picture for memories of  past sensory 
perceptions, for he thought sensory memories were stored for later retrieval by folds which 
appeared in one’s brain when one perceives an object through the senses.  When one tries to 
remember what one perceived on some earlier occasion, the mind causes the pineal gland to 
direct some animal spirits through these folds, which in turn causes the pineal gland to 
wiggle, causing a memory perception to appear in one’s mind.  It is furthermore plausible 
that Descartes thought this process of  external storage and retrieval also occurred when one 
recalled earlier demonstrative reasoning which employed one’s quasi-sensory faculty of  the 
imagination—for example, when one recalls one’s earlier demonstration of  a geometrical 
theorem.  While I discuss the historical issue in greater detail elsewhere (Barnett, MS), the 
upshot is that on Descartes’s view much of  our cognition involves processes which are 
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strictly speaking external to our minds—not only in perception and sensory memory, but 
also in reasoning involving complex geometrical demonstrations. 
More recent diary theorists like Pollock reject Cartesian dualism.   But even Pollock 36
often characterizes person-level mental phenomena in a way that seems to presuppose a 
restricted conception of  genuinely mental states like the state of  believing something for a 
given set of  reasons.  Pollock says that one’s current reasons for believing that p can include 
only the contents of  one’s occurrent mental states, such as one’s other occurrent beliefs, or 
thoughts.  When you arrive at the occurrent thought that p after going through a long and 
complex argument, Pollock says that your reasons for thinking p will not include the 
contents of  your non-occurrent beliefs in the argument’s initial premises.  Instead, your 
reasons are limited to the content of  your occurrent thoughts, which will include only some 
intermediate lemmas from which p follows more directly.  And since your reasons at this 
point for occurrently believing the lemmas can include only your occurrent mental states, the 
only plausible candidates for your reasons for these thoughts are facts about what you 
currently seem to remember.   The quick and dirty version of  Pollock’s rationale is as 37
follows: 
At any given time we are apt to have many beliefs but few thoughts.  It is 
difficult to hold many thoughts in mind at one time.  In particular, we rarely 
hold an entire argument (even a simple one) in mind at one time. 
Psychological evidence indicates that people can hold about seven items in 
mind at one time. (1999, 45) 
We do not hold an entire argument in mind at one time.  Rather, we step 
through it sequentially, holding no more than a few lines at a time in 
occurrent thought.  (1999, 49) 
If  we accepted a metaphysical picture like Descartes’s, there would be a clear reason 
to take ‘holding an argument in mind’ and holding that argument ‘in occurrent thought’ to 
be equivalent.  The state of  having an argument written in a diary in one’s pocket is not a 
mental state, nor (assuming Descartes’s view) is having some neural tissue folded in such a 
way that one is disposed to have an occurrent recollection of  that argument.  So there is an 
obvious sense in which neither state is sufficient for holding that argument in one’s mind. 
But unless we give up the commonsensical view that non-occurrent beliefs are mental states, 
we should grant that if  you non-occurrently believe every step of  an argument, then you do 
‘hold the argument in mind’. 
 Chisholm notably accepted both the diary model of  the epistemology of  memory (1989) and an overtly 36
Cartesian picture of  the metaphysics of  mind (1991)—although Chisholm, unlike Descartes, thought that the 
mind has a spatial location (somewhere inside the head!).  Although it seems to me unlikely to be a coincidence 
that Chisholm accepted both the epistemology and the metaphysics of  Descartes’s theory of  memory, I am 
aware of  no place where Chisholm makes the connection explicit.
 As noted in fn. 25 above, there is room for an alternative version of  the diary model that says that it is your 37
apparent memories themselves, rather than your awareness of  facts about them, that justifies your current 
beliefs.  It is unclear to me whether this alternative version is a better reconstruction of  Pollock’s view.  Still, we 
can set this interpretive matter to one side, since the differences between these two versions of  the diary model 
will not affect our argument.
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Diary theorists like Pollock can be understood as ‘externalizing’ one’s own memory 
faculties in the following way:  On their view, there is a sharp explanatory divide between 
thoughts and non-occurrent beliefs, for only the former can figure in a rational explanation 
for one’s present belief  that p.  The premises stored in one’s memory, on their view, cannot 
be among the reasons that justify one’s present thought that p, any more than the premises 
written in a diary in one’s pocket can be.  But if  premises that one non-occurrently believes 
cannot be among the reasons for one’s present thought that p, non-occurrent beliefs seem to 
be beliefs only in a loose and approximate manner of  speaking.  For the state of  having 
propositions stored in memory, like the state of  having them written in a diary in one’s 
pocket, are treated by the diary theorist as merely grounding a disposition to be in some 
further occurrent state of  occurrently thinking the proposition, which alone can supply the 
reasons for further thoughts and actions.  So on a view like Pollock’s, it is the occurrent state 
of  having a thought, rather than any non-occurrent state, which serves the epistemically 
significant explanatory role ordinarily taken to be characteristic of  beliefs. 
A diary theorist like Pollock thus wants to say the same thing about the storage and 
retrieval of  information in memory that we naively want to say about recording and later 
reading a diary entry.  That is, he wants to say that in storing and later retrieving a conclusion 
from memory, your reasons for believing the conclusion change.  If  you start out believing a 
conclusion based on a set of  premises, then when you later recall the conclusion without 
recalling the premises, your situation is akin to the detective who reads in his long-lost diary 
that it was Plum who committed the murder without reading the clues that initially 
persuaded him of  the conclusion.  Just as the detective at the later time believes that it was 
Plum on the basis of  its saying so in his diary rather than on the basis of  his initial clues, 
when you recall a conclusion from memory without recalling your evidence, your judgment 
that the conclusion is true is based on your seeming to remember that it is true rather than 
on the basis of  your initial evidence or premises. 
In addition to its unattractive downstream epistemic consequences, a diary-like 
metaphysics of  mind is independently unappealing.  Ordinarily we do not take your current 
reasons for believing a proposition to be limited to things you are currently thinking about. 
For example, you easily can think of  a philosophical view which you have held for some 
time, for reasons which you have considered persuasive all along.  During most of  the time 
you held the view you were not even thinking about it, so your reason for holding the view 
could not have been a recollection (or apparent memory) that the view is true.  When 
someone asks what you think about the view, you do not typically delay your response until 
you have had the time to think through your reasons from scratch—you just tell them what 
you think.  But that does not mean that you at that moment only hold the view because you 
occurrently seem to remember that it is true.  Your reasons for holding your philosophical 
views might change over time in response to objections, but they do not change dramatically 
from one moment to the next, depending on what you are thinking about. 
8.  Conclusion 
There is room in discussions of  the epistemology of  memory for disagreement 
about when the fact that you seem to remember that p amounts to a sufficiently good reason 
for you to believe that p is true.  But as we have seen, the disagreement between 
preservativists and diary theorists is not in the first instance a disagreement of  this kind, for 
the preservativist denies in the first place that, in ordinary cases, the fact that you seem to 
remember that p is your reason for believing that p is true.  Instead, the question over which 
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preservativists and diary theorists divide concerns what your reasons ordinarily are for your 
beliefs.  We have seen another example of  this type of  disagreement in the debate over 
alleged examples of  extended mental states like in Otto’s Diary.  As we have said, there 
appears to be a sub-personal level of  explanation on which it is clear what is going on in 
Otto’s head and in his interaction with the diary.  What is controversial is what it means at 
the personal level of  Otto’s beliefs and reasons.  If  we accept that there is a tight connection 
between justification and rational explanation, then disagreements between diary theorists 
and preservativists about memory can be understood in a corresponding way.  The 
preservativist surely should grant to diary theorists like Pollock that reasoning often involves 
the storage and later retrieval of  information in long-term memory.  What they should 
dispute is the diary theorist’s assumptions about how these sub-personal psychological 
process contribute to the attitudes and reasons of  the whole person.  If  this is right, then the 
disagreement concerning the epistemology of  memory is downstream from a prior 
disagreement in the philosophy of  mind. 
More generally, we might divide an overall theory of  justified belief  into two parts, 
the first of  which concerns distinctively normative matters pertaining to epistemology, while 
the second of  which concerns descriptive matters pertaining to the philosophy of  mind. 
The normative part talks about what would or would not be a good reason for believing that 
p—it says things like ‘e1 is a strong reason to believe that p, but e2 is not’.  The descriptive 
part talks about the nature of  belief  and of  rational explanation—it says things like ‘In this 
sort of  case, you believe p for the reason that e1, but in that sort of  case, you believe that p 
for the reason that e2’.  We want these two parts of  our theory to line up with one another in 
the following way.  In a case where we think that an agent’s belief  is justified, we want the 
descriptive part to tell us that her reasons are ones that the normative part says are good 
reasons.  And in a case where we think that an agent’s belief  is unjustified, we want the 
descriptive part to tell us that her reasons are ones that the normative part says are bad 
reasons. 
I have claimed that in an important sense the epistemology of  memory depends 
upon prior (or ‘upstream’) questions in the philosophy of  mind.  But the kind of  priority 
being granted to the philosophy of  mind is metaphysical, not methodological priority. 
Whether you are justified in holding a belief  depends metaphysically on what your reasons 
are for holding that belief.  But that does not mean that we must grant methodological 
priority to descriptive questions of  what your reasons are, rather than to normative questions 
of  whether you are justified.  In trying to get the moving parts of  our overall theory to align, 
and yield the verdicts about cases that we think they should, we can make adjustments to 
both the normative and the descriptive components.  Regarding ordinary cases of  memory 
like Two Beliefs, we have not had to make any major tradeoffs.  For in these cases, 
considerations in epistemology favor a normative theory that, in conjunction with a 
descriptive theory that is independently motivated by considerations in the philosophy of  
mind, yield the verdicts that we want our overall theory of  rational belief  to yield.  But it is 
possible that for more difficult cases involving forgotten evidence, memory slips, and 
defeating evidence about one’s memory, we will find ourselves forced to make tough choices. 
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